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Soloy, William, M.A., Spring, 2014      English 
 
“Stepping Outside: The Shifting Subjectivities of Post-Romantic Poetry” 
 
Chairperson: Robert M. Baker 
 
Abstract:  
 
This investigation traces the arc of fracturing and exteriorizing subjectivities in the post-
Romantic poetries of Modernism and Postmodernism, ultimately considering the state 
of contemporary Postmodern subjectivity after the Language Poets.  
 
Focusing primarily on T.S. Eliot, John Ashbery, and Christian Hawkey, the thesis argues 
that the I/Other split associated with Romantic poetry’s idealized Othering of nature 
performs a major shift with the interiorizing fragmentation of the speaker(s) in “The 
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock.” The anxiety produced by this claustrophobic, internal 
splitting of voices reaches critical mass in the chorus of difficult-to-trace speakers of 
“The Waste Land,” causing a breach of interior containment which projects the internal 
polyphony of voices outward. John Ashbery continues this exteriorizing polyphony, as 
evidenced by his ruminations on the surfaces of representation and his dispersal of 
subjectivity through the use of pronouns. With one foot moving forward into the post-
structuralist avant-garde and another nostalgically reaching for Romantic unity, 
Ashbery represents the messy progression of post-Romantic innovation. By the time of 
Christian Hawkey’s Ventrakl, the anxieties relating to the death of the contained, 
Romantic self have lessened with distance, but the legacy of Language poetics (which 
took the de-authoring, exteriorizing arc to its logical extreme) has left contemporary 
innovative poets with the challenge of reclaiming human subjectivity without ignoring 
complications raised by generations of problematizing experimenters. By 
“collaborating” with dead poets and creatively “translating” foreign language texts, 
writers like Hawkey are seeking a “middle voice” that retrieves the human element while 
challenging the myth of a unified self. 
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Introduction  
 
 
 
 Using T.S. Eliot’s “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” as the starting point and 
Christian Hawkey’s recent Ventrakl as the terminus—with John Ashbery’s Self-Portrait 
in a Convex Mirror placed neatly in between—we can note that Eliot, Ashbery, and 
Hawkey represent exactly one century of drastic changes. Hawkey’s experimental 
“collaboration,” Ventrakl, was published exactly thirty-five years after John Ashbery’s 
Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, and exactly 1oo years after Eliot began writing “The 
Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock.” The litany of marvels and horrors occurring between 
1910 and 2010 hardly needs to be recounted here, but suffice it to say that the scales of 
warfare, technology, urbanization, and media communication have grown 
exponentially, and these profound cultural changes have had their effect on how we view 
ourselves and how these selves encounter others. Unsurprisingly, the speaking I of 
poetry reflects these changes and continues to adapt, as it has for centuries. 
 All subsequent Anglophone poetries have had to negotiate their relationships to 
the ubiquitous, latent echo of the Romantic poets. This negotiation gets exponentially 
trickier when mediated through later movements’ reactions. This is to say that by the 
time one is reacting to a reaction to a reaction (ad seemingly infinitum), one’s exact 
orientation within the mess of reactions is nigh impossible to reckon. For instance, 
Modernism, at least through my retrospective reduction and Eliot’s example, gathers 
much of its definition from its simultaneous resistance-to and mimetic furthering-of 
Romanticism’s aesthetic and existential tenets. Postmodernism, then, in its reaction to 
its precursors’ own complicated reactions, adds yet another layer to the untidy bundle. 
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 Romanticism hardly dropped, fully formed, to Earth without influence. It, too, 
was the product of endless visions and revisions. Joel Fineman has persuasively argued 
that Shakespeare’s sonnets introduced a new complication into the subjective speaker of 
English lyric. Shakespeare’s influence on his successors is, of course, still apparent 
today, and was certainly essential to the Romantic aesthetic, as illustrated by Keats’ 
insistence on having Shakespeare’s texts near him every time he wrote. But I have to 
pick a starting point, and the poetry at the time of the Industrial Revolution—with its 
responses to the modernizing innovations that have so radically influenced our sense of 
distances, interiority and exteriority, and subjectivities—seems like a fitting antecedent, 
a necessary anchor. Admittedly, any group definition is going to be at least somewhat 
artificial and simplistic; any notion of generational legacy/curse is going to reveal more 
of a sloppily interconnected continuum than a direct ancestral arc; and, of course, any 
supposed “tenets” of said dubiously defined groups are going to be consequently 
artificial and simplistic. Caveats noted, there does seem to be something essential to 
Romanticism that’s hung on through the years.  
 Marjorie Perloff, in The Poetics of Indeterminacy, argues that the essential 
remainder from Romanticism can actually be divided into two twin legacies: one strand 
traceable back to Baudelaire, the other to Rimbaud. “Whereas Baudelaire and Mallarmé 
point the way to the ‘High Modernism’” of Yeats, Eliot, et al, “it is Rimbaud who strikes 
the first note of that ‘undecidability’” found in Stein, Pound, Williams, et al, “an 
undecidability that has become marked in the poetry of the last decade [the 1970s]” (4). 
For the sake of my focus, I’ll simplify her bifurcated lineage to: 1) a Baudelarian strand 
connecting French Romanticism to Eliot’s brand of Modernism, and 2) a Rimbaldian 
strand veering away from Eliot (through Modernists such as Stein) to Ashbery. 
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Responding to Rimbaud’s famous claim, “Je est un autre,” Perloff argues that the 
Rimbaldian strand more drastically departs from English Romanticism: “If the ‘I’ 
becomes ‘another,’ the Romantic dualism of subject and object is resolved; the self no 
longer contemplates nature but becomes part of its operational process” (60). While I 
think that this too readily pronounces Romantic dualism resolved (and that the 
distinction is both helpful in its contrast of Eliot and Ashbery and too absolute in 
separating them), I think that it can be extracted into a useful generalization that I’ll 
diagram as such: 
 Romanticismthe self contemplates nature 
 Modernismthe self contemplates the self (or its fracturing selves) 
 Postmodernismthe self contemplates the self contemplating the self/selves 
 (One strand of) Contemporary Postmodernismthe self hybridizes with an Other 
   to remove the veil of authority and create a new Outside self.  
 One central aspect defining each generation of poetry has been the character of 
the I. By following its (d)evolution, we can see vestiges and ancestral ghosts informing 
contemporary poetics. Entering conversations shaped and furthered by T.S. Eliot, 
Gertrude Stein, John Ashbery, and Jack Spicer (to name an impossibly non-
comprehensive quartet), poets like Christian Hawkey and Elizabeth Robinson are taking 
their respective pliers to the wrought and rusted form of the I. By engaging in the 
construction of our cultural selves (and the language used to speak these selves), 
innovative poets are perpetuating and modeling a new  resistance to both readymade 
modes of identification and the cultural, linguistic, and personal coercion enabled by 
such prefabricated senses of the I.  
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 Picking up the trajectory of a general movement from the early modal subjectivity 
of Shakespeare’s sonnets through the Industrial Revolution-resistant and 
Enlightenment-resistant model of a Romantic subject, I hope to trace its continuation to 
the idiosyncrasies of the speaking subject in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. 
Focusing on three main poets, Eliot, Ashbery, and Hawkey, with a nod to 
contemporaries and/or counter-examples complementary in both time period and 
poetics, I hope to illustrate how the post-Romantic I has undergone a far-from-linear 
but demonstrative shift from the Inside to the Outside.  
 Romantic poets, in their resistance to both the Enlightenment’s infatuation with 
Reason and the industrialized world’s affront to nature, sought expression via the 
internal mediation of the imagination and the body’s sensory absorption. Typically, this 
escape into the self comes in solitude, setting up a much-cited distance between self 
(poet) and Other (nature).  Nature is important, but it serves as a channel for the 
contemplative mind—an external gift for the senses to translate inward into thought. 
 Eliot, vocally resistant to Romantic ideals, nevertheless propagated many of their 
aesthetic assumptions and tenets, resulting in an anxiety of the pluralizing voices of his 
speakers’ inner monologues.  Ashbery, though less explicitly anxious in response to his 
voices’ pluralizations, furthered Eliot’s fracturing of the I by willfully allowing the 
ubiquitous voices of his culture to speak his poems via a “surfacing” in line with Fredric 
Jameson’s descriptions of Postmodernism. Christian Hawkey, perpetuating Ashbery’s 
interrogation of the speaking self, uses de-authoring methodologies to disrupt the sense 
of “I,” enacting a post-Romantic, post-Structuralist struggle against intrinsic or extrinsic 
organizing teleologies.  
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 Each of these poets—simultaneously innovative and tethered to the traditions 
that preceded them—defies a neat, linear narrative of chronologic causality. In the 
movement from Eliot to Hawkey, however, it is possible to trace a dissolution of 
authority in the speaking I, a dissolution that seems to parallel an increasing skepticism 
in organizing systems (religious, economic, or otherwise) which conceive of human 
intelligence and intelligibility as a closed circle.   
 In arguing for a traceable continuum of exteriorizing subjectivities, I’m flirting 
with two possibilities I hope to resist: that a periodizing argument must necessarily 
reduce its examples to an absolute synecdoche; and that chronologic framing implies a 
one-way causality, displacing idiosyncrasies and contradictions in the messy movement 
of artistic (d)evolutions. I do not want my focus on Eliot, Ashbery, or Hawkey to seem to 
try and speak for—or ignore—contemporaries with drastically differing aesthetics and 
intentions. Readily admitting defeat in the face of a comprehensive representation of 
“Modernist Poetry,” “Posmodernist Poetry,” etc., I instead choose to focus on three 
poets with enough in common—in terms of methodology and engagement with 
subjectivity, specifically—to make their differences revealing.   
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1. Modernism: More than One I in Eliot 
 
 “The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock” introduces T.S. Eliot’s engagement with the 
fracturing inner life of the Modern “hero.” The poem, first published in 1915, follows the 
conflicted, interior voices of its eponymous protagonist.  Prufrock is prone to making 
grand rhetorical gestures and considering the weight of his potential powers (“Do I dare 
/ Disturb the universe?”); at the same time, he is a deferential, balding little man, 
impotent and projecting images of limp passivity onto the world (the sky as “a patient 
etherized upon a table”). 
 This paradoxical hybrid of powerful private hero and powerless social cog is 
dynamic and reflects the social landscape, shaking off the Victorian era and building 
toward the first World War (Eliot began the poem in 191o). In Prufrock, we can observe 
the Modern Man—a peculiar specimen who is not handling Romanticism’s I-World 
Othering very healthily. The dissonance between the interior Prufrock’s delusional, if 
desperate, hubris and the oppressive demands of his external contemporary world 
causes real anxiety. The violent interior trauma—rending apart the Romantic, contained 
self—forces one to fracture, to become the You and I of a schizophrenic monologue.  
 In these splintered roles, one readies one’s self for the workaday performances 
(“to prepare a face to meet the faces that you meet”), putting on the masks of supporting 
roles (Prufrock insists that he’s not Hamlet; rather, some attending lord). Prufrock 
retains a lingering sense of a complete, Romantic hero with the  assured agency of one 
who might fit the world into her/his aperture, to “squeeze the universe into a ball”; but 
the eyes of others leave him “pinned and wriggling on the wall.” 
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 If we view the character of Prufrock as a catalyst for a more general anxiety 
between competing eras, the manifestation of anxiety as internally imprisoned 
subjectivities makes sense. While the juxtaposition of the interior to the exterior is not 
anathema to Romantic lyric, the cloistered concentration of Prufrock’s frictive voices 
induces an effect with more irony, yet more immediacy, than his predecessors’ 
contemplative musings. Eliot’s use of subjectivity is also essential in revealing the 
anxiety specific to conflicting private/social performances. The initial address is in the 
rhetorical garb of a plea to the beloved, but, as the poem progresses, a beloved is never 
revealed, revealing, instead, only self-examining selves. If Prufrock were addressing an 
Other— be it a beloved, a distant friend, or idealized nature itself—then the speaker 
would have an outlet, a confidante. By responding to the external pressures via an 
inward address, Eliot’s Prufrock is rejecting a reunion with the “beauteous forms” above 
Tintern Abbey (or the unguent salve of sweet memory itself)—denying an outward 
channel of rumination and, ultimately, comfort. The melancholia frequenting Romantic 
odes and meditations diffuses its catharsis and distancing through the Other. Though 
Wordsworth is also talking to himself in “Tintern Abbey,” he routes the soliloquy 
through the calming beauty of nature. Though they begin in his head and end in his 
head, Wordsworth’s ruminations, as they travel through the restorative energy of the 
Othered exterior, exorcise most neuroses and claustrophobic tensions. The release that 
might come from divesting one’s solitary troubles onto an exterior—if only for awhile—is 
impossible for Prufrock. Wordsworth takes comfort in not only an exteriorized ideal of 
nature, but in the palliative assurance that the memories he and his sister share will 
endure—that memory itself turns time to his side. For Prufrock, Romantic escape f is 
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impossible, and the chambers of the sea, far from providing solace, become the scene of 
drowning.  
 “Prufrock” introduces a pluralization of the speaking self and carries the 
mounting tension caused by a swallowed chorus of internalized voices trying to get out. 
In “The Waste Land,” these issues burst out. The poem presents a more complex 
amalgamation of voices, settings, and literary and religious antecedents, forming a 
roiling montage of a poem. In “‘The Waste Land’: Ur-Text of Destruction,” Ruth Nevo 
describes the piece as “totally, radically nonintegrative and antidiscursive, its parts 
connected by neither causes, effects, parallelism, nor antithesis. It is a cinematographic 
mélange or montage of glimpses, gestures, images, echoes, voices, phrases, memories, 
fragments of speech, song, quotation, appearances, and disappearances” (98).  
 But the poem is not entirely uncentered. Resistant to neat narrative synopsis, it 
floats in and out of different scenes but maintains repeated thematic, imagistic, and 
historical continuities, many revolving around death, or at least lifelessness. Using “The 
Burial of the Dead,” the first of five sections, as an example, we can see themes of death 
and memory weave through sudden shifts in scene and voice. After an untranslated 
epigraph from Petronius’ Satyricon—in which the sibyl (who’d been granted 
immortality but not eternal youth) begs for death—the poem proper begins with an 
unidentified speaker lamenting the cruelty of April and the life-giving spring troubling 
the dead land. From here, readers quickly finds themselves swept along into memories 
of cafes and sled rides in and around Munich. The narrator, we learn, is named Marie 
(for now), and her memories are interrupted by the first strophe break, returning us to 
“the stony rubbish” of the waste land. Suddenly, untranslated Wagner swoops in and 
soon we’re back in memory—with dialogue now in quotation marks and without 
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reference—as the narrator confesses, “I could not / Speak, and my eyes failed, I was 
neither / Living nor dead, and I knew nothing, / Looking into the heart of light, the 
silence.” The poem jump-cuts again to “Madame Sosostris, famous clairvoyante,” with 
her pack of tarot cards. She presents the drowned Phoenician Sailor (and other cards 
that Eliot simply made up), warning, “Fear death by water.” One last strophe break and 
the reader is in The City (London’s financial district), referred to as “Unreal City.” A 
crowd crossing London Bridge is described with language lifted from The Inferno (“I 
had not thought death had undone so many”)—pairing the modern workers staring at 
their feet with the souls entering hell—when the speaker has a disturbing encounter with 
an acquaintance and the section ends with their anomalous amalgamation of dialogue, 
collected from many different literary sources (according to Eliot’s notes), the last being 
Baudelaire. 
 Described sequentially, “The Waste Land” may appear to be an impenetrable, 
arbitrary mess. However, as Perloff argues, “‘The Waste Land’ has, despite its temporal 
and spatial dislocations and its collage form, a perfectly coherent symbolic structure” 
(Poetics, 13). In subsequent sections the scene may abruptly shift from a high-class 
London parlor to a pub at closing time, or from the bank of the Thames to a sordid 
indoor tryst—barely consensual at best—between a typist and a “young carbuncular”; 
yet, the recurring classical references and their accompanying motifs permit a through-
line of deeper narrative. Characters and situations are repeated. To wit: 
 • Philomel, a victim of rape by King Tiresius who was later turned into a 
nightingale, appears in a painting on the wall of a high-class woman in section two and 
quickly resonates with the coerced sex scene in the following section, the same scene in 
which the nightingale’s “jug jug” is sung;  
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 • “Death by Water,” of which Madame Sosostris’s client is warned, is the name of 
the fourth section, in which a Phoenician sailor is drowned;  
 • the Wagner quote, from Tristan und Isolde, joins Germany, sailors, and 
doomed trysts with later sections;  
 • the grail legend, especially the character of The Fisher King, reappears, as does 
another meeting on the bridge, introduced by the repetition of “Unreal City”; 
 • the last section returns to a place where there is “no water but only rock” and 
where “He who was living is now dead / We who were living are now dying,” bookending 
the poem’s sections in similar landscape and tone. 
 Removed from a sequential linearity, the parallel scenes and references form an 
amalgamatory cohesion that’s far from arbitrary. There is also the centering weight of 
geographic reference. The landmarks surrounding Eliot’s London office, The City 
around Lloyd’s, affix the roving references and scenes to a physically present place. 
Using the tangible foundation of his familiar neighborhood, Eliot begins to stack 
reference upon reference, story upon story.  The effect is certainly one of initial 
defamiliarization, but “The Waste Land”—containing “a heap of broken images” in 
which the speaker seems to “connect / nothing with nothing,” carrying along “These 
fragments I have shored against my ruins”—persists in maintaining the memory of a 
whole, to which the broken ruins stand as monuments. 
Just as “Prufrock” projects its protagonist’s limp social passivity onto the outside 
world by etherizing the sky (and opening the door to a transgression of the I/World 
split), “The Waste Land” also projects its pervasive theme of lifelessness and 
fragmentation outward. The external scenes of “The Waste Land,” though, display a 
more severe trauma, reflected in the more traumatic fragmentation of the subject. 
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Methodologically, there is conflicting tension in the role of the fractured voices: they 
push towards disunity in the heterogeneous sources; yet, counter-intuitively, the 
removal of easily identifiable speakers results in a somewhat unified poetic voice, 
revealed through the craft itself. The more impossible it is to attach “T.S. Eliot” to a 
consistent speaker, the easier it becomes to view the poem less as a vessel for one voice 
and more as a medium for the juggling of many voices by the deft hands of a single poet. 
The disembodiment that occurs in “Prufrock” gives way to an erasure of lines of 
source/voice demarcation, so that the enactment of metaphysical/corporeal tension is 
achieved through both content and form, through the use of pastiche or montage. With 
any given I linked to a cluster of literary, historical, and personal referents, the very idea 
of a self-contained I in an ever-shrinking world seems more and more absurd. 
Attempting to parse out the apostrophes, Michael H. Levenson interrogates 
pronoun usage in “The Waste Land”: 
 Certainly we want to identify the "us" that winter kept warm with the "us"  
that summer surprised, and with the "we" who stop, go on, drink coffee and talk. 
 That is how we expect pronouns to behave: same referents unless new 
antecedents. But if the pronouns suggest a stable identity for the speaker, much  
else has already become unstable. Landscape has given way to cityscape. General  
speculation (April as the "cruellest month") resolves into a particular memory:  
the day in the Hofgarten. And the stylistic pattern shifts. The series of participles 
 disappears, replaced by a series of verbs in conjunction: "And went ... And drank 
 ... And talked." The adjective-noun pattern is broken. 
 What can we conclude so far?—that a strain exists between the presumed 
 identity of the poem's speaker and the instability of the speaker's world. If this is 
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 the speech of one person, it has the range of many personalities and many voices. 
(“A Genealogy of Modernism”) 
Beyond the general pluralization of voices represented formally, there is one 
specific scene that resonates with the internal apostrophe of “Prufrock.”  In “What the 
Thunder Said,” the final section of “The Waste Land” (after a strophe-long lamentation 
on the landscape’s lack of water), another jump-cut introduces a new set of unnamed 
characters, one addressing another: 
Who is the third who walks always beside you? 
When I count, there are only you and I together 
But when I look ahead up the white road 
There is always another one walking beside you 
Gliding wrapt in a brown mantle, hooded 
I do not know whether a man or a woman 
—But who is that on the other side of you? 
Prufrock’s You and I is further complicated to an I/You/The Third. Whereas 
Prufrock was internally addressing himself, the speaker in “The Waste Land” is now 
addressing an unnamed Other and a peripheral third. By not defining the addressee, 
again, Eliot revisits the internalized tension of Prufrock’s impotent address, but this 
time the pressure has forced a breech. Rather than diluting itself through a cleansing 
exchange with nature, the internalized pressure of composite speakers infects the 
previously Othered arena of nature. In short, the fracturing self is now appearing in the 
external world, if only from the periphery. 
The encroaching proximity of the formerly discrete and sacred realms of interior 
and Other (along with the very real fear of mechanized, embattled modernity) allows for 
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the Romantic splitting of Self and Other to reach its crisis. It allows a man to sing a love 
song to himself. And this serenade is far removed from Whitman’s girded yawp, though 
it certainly contains multitudes. It is fractured, discordant, and self-interrogating. In her 
diary on May 25, 1940, Virginia Woolf described Eliot as “a very self centered, self 
torturing and self examining man,” and it is this uneasy examination (of himself, of his 
art and, by extension, of us, the readers) which provides the anxiety that fuels his 
disunities—fragments of self with no unified whole to return to. In “T.S. Eliot and the 
Cultural Divide,” David E. Chinitz sums it up: “Eliot was a compulsive self-fashioner and 
a deft one, but the selves that he fashioned were not merely facades concealing some 
shrouded essential self” (175). The impossibility of unearthing an essential self was a 
traumatic revelation. It’s not an idea that dies easily. In a post-Romantic world 
shrinking its previous distances with the far reaches of technology and world war, the 
desire for a stable, essential, singular self was at great dissonance with its environs. This 
rift caused real anxiety.  
Eliot’s “I,” “You,” and “Third” are all double parts (triple parts, etc.) of the 
contained Romantic I he worked so hard to outpace. By projecting the unstable 
elements of its person outward into another addressable form, Eliot’s speaker moves 
beyond the ruminative inner turmoils of the Wordsworthian speaker and enters a new 
model of neurotic, outwardly articulated, self-address. The outward articulation, in turn, 
helps represent the messy world in which it was written. In his poem “Seasons on 
Earth,” Kenneth Koch, with a characteristic half-wink, claims that “The Waste Land,” in 
its confusion and splintered mess, “gave the time’s most accurate data.” 
 If we accept the premise of Perloff’s twofold path, then the fragmenting 
subjectivities of Eliot lack a certain “undecidability,” by nature of his inclusion in the 
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Baudelaire camp. She argues, “In Rimbaud, the Romantic distinction between subject 
and object, a distinction that persists in the poetry of Yeats and Eliot, collapses” (59). I 
argue that Eliot’s innovative methodology contains its own undecidability, one resistant 
to Rimbaud’s legacy, but nevertheless covertly influencing his experimentation, 
especially in “Prufrock” and “The Waste Land.” Eliot casually dismissed much of 
Rimbaud’s legacy, from French skeptical anti-authoritarian theorists to Dada.  Eliot, 
famously reverential of his own tradition, is less laudatory about others’. In “The Lesson 
on Baudelaire,” written at the same time he was finishing “The Waste Land,” he writes: 
 With regard to certain intellectual activities across the Channel, which at the 
 moment appear to take the place of poetry in the life of Paris, some effort ought  
 to be made to arrive at an intelligent point of view on this side. It is probable that 
 this French performance is of value almost exclusively for the local audience; I do 
 not here assert that it has any value at all, only that its pertinence, if it has any, is 
 to a small public formidably well instructed in its own literary history, erudite 
 and stuffed with tradition to the point of bursting. (144) 
Later in the same piece, he chimes in on Dada and the role of morality in poetry, a 
preoccupation that will soon start to pull him away from poetry and toward religiously 
tinted cultural lecturing and drama. He opines: 
 Whatever value there may be in Dada depends upon the extent to which it is a 
 moral criticism of French literature and French life. All first-rate poetry is 
 occupied with morality: this is the lesson of Baudelaire. More than any poet of his 
 time, Baudelaire was aware of what most mattered: the problem of good and evil. 
 (144). 
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Eliot, it would seem, would approve of Perloff’s designation. It’s important, 
however, not to let Eliot’s differences from the Rimbaldian strain of Perloff’s schematic 
suggest that his poetry was a reversion to easier modes of subjectivity. Levenson argues 
that, given the use of perspective in “The Waste Land”: 
Any unity will be provisional; we may always expect new poetic elements, 
 demanding new assimilation. Thus the voice of Tiresias, having provided a 
 moment of authoritative consciousness at the centre of the poem, falls silent, 
 letting events speak for themselves. And the voice in the last several lines, having 
 become conscious of fragmentation, suddenly gives way to more fragments. The 
 polyphony of The Waste Land allows for intermittent harmonies, but these 
 harmonies are not sustained; the consistencies are not permanent. Eliot's method 
 must be carefully distinguished from the methods of his modernist predecessors. 
 If we attempt to make The Waste Land conform to Imagism or Impressionism, 
 we miss its strategy and miss its accomplishment. Eliot wrenched his poetry from 
 the self-sufficiency of the single image and the single narrating consciousness. 
 The principle of order in The Waste Land depends on a plurality of 
 consciousnesses, an ever-increasing series of points of view, which struggle 
 towards an emergent unity and then continue to struggle past that unity. 
 (Geneology) 
On the other side of that unity blow the seeds of Postmodernism. 
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2. Postmodernism: Ashbery and the Reflection Once-Removed 
 
—with a segue via Gertrude Stein— 
  
 At around the same time that Eliot was finishing up “The Love Song of J. Alfred 
Prufrock,” Gertrude Stein was sending Tender Buttons into the world. While Eliot was 
foregrounding Baudelaire’s moral standing, Gertrude Stein was indeed more 
comfortable taking Rimbaud’s lead in challenging genres and the subjectivities they 
contained without occupying herself explicitly with morality. With her radically playful 
senses of the speaking self, Stein famously wrote autobiographies from others’ 
perspectives and composed synaesthetic verbal portraits of others, most notably Pablo 
Picasso. The influence of Modernist painters on her writing and her life is well-
documented, but the effect of the style’s rupturing of monolithic perspective—eschewing 
figurative realism by rendering multiple, irreconcilable perspectives simultaneously—is 
vital to her ventriloquism and our present discussion. By “completing” a portrait of 
Picasso and writing her autobiography through the proffered perspective of her life-
partner, Stein made something of a career out of complicating the transmission from 
interior subject to external object. Whether engaging the medium of poetry, 
(auto)biography, novel, opera, or play, Stein relentlessly interrogated the assumptions 
(often patriarchal and involving “mastery”) behind each form. Constantly questioning 
without seeking an essence, she acted as something of an anti-Heidegger.  
More good-humored and probably more dramatically deviant than Eliot’s attack 
on the single self, Stein’s writing often gets lumped in with a generalized Modernist 
response to the wars. Certainly, there are similarities in their contexts (American ex-
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pats in Europe around the time of the wars) and innovation. Certainly many artistic 
groupings are applied retroactively and for the sake of neat narratives. Still, I’m 
interested in the fact that many articulate critics insist on pairing Eliot and Stein based 
on ideas of fracturing, but few correlate (despite their differences in tone and reference) 
their use of the role of artist/speaker to problematize their own pulpits. Both are 
commonly viewed as auteurs, strongly-voiced virtuosos of their respective poetic angles; 
yet, their adoption of split personalities—or wholly separate, untenably coexistent 
personalities—is arguably more subversive than the collage/montage/associative-
amalgamation methodology of their poems. Too easily, they’re relegated to the lauded 
roles of formal innovators and denied the dubious honor of publically challenging the 
viability of an entire pronoun.  
Stein’s similarity to Eliot may be less obvious—and, indeed, weaker—than her 
connection to John Ashbery (just as Ashbery’s similarity to Eliot may be displaced by an 
allegiance to Stein’s brand of Modernism), but this is where I hope to complicate 
Perloff’s bifurcation. Just as Eliot’s apostrophic soliloquy is an adaptation of a previous 
movement’s staging of subjectivity, so too is John Ashbery’s idiosyncratic reinvention of 
the poetic speaker. His speakers’ self-negations may seem familiar to a reader of 
“Prufrock,” and the difficulty of placing the source of each voice recalls “The Waste 
Land,” but Ashbery takes Eliot’s disjunctive methodology and runs with it to a new level 
of subjective defamiliarization. While the reader of “The Waste Land” may have to parse 
the geographic and literary references to construct the stacked world that Eliot is 
alluding to, a bit of leg work will typically solve the riddle. Ashbery’s manifold voices, 
however—even when they have a discernible source to pursue—most often elude logical 
connection. Often preferring associative intuition over directive narration, Ashbery’s 
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poems mimetically conjure the polyphonic din of the late twentieth century while 
scrutinizing the modes of representation and perception being practiced by its citizens.  
Ashbery’s poetic persona is most often described as that of a chameleon: his use 
of pronouns as interchangeable pieces in a vast Postmodern speaking apparatus 
(including centuries-old references and contemporary advertising detritus side-by-side) 
allows his speakers to report from all vantages in the messy web of late twentieth- 
century communication, “until no part / Remains that is surely you” (“Self-Portrait in a 
Convex Mirror”).  
An established art critic before breaking through in poetry, Ashbery often revisits 
aesthetic issues, referencing his own creative impulses as well as his reservations. His 
most influential poem, the title poem from Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror, is a 
sustained investigation into seeing and representation. Though less disjunctive in voice 
than many other Ashbery poems, it stands as an invaluable example of his Postmodern 
ruminations. In the way that Wordsworth may contemplate a river or an abbey, Ashbery 
contemplates a sixteenth-century painting. They are both using the external referent as 
a channel for self-reflection; however, instead of representing a metonym for some 
essential aspect of nature—as a sun-gilded river valley might stand-in for the roiling 
movement of memory or the golden touch of friendship on the soul’s swelling song, 
etc.—Ashbery’s painting represents the surface, illusory aspects of representation.  
Enmeshed, like so many of his New York School compatriots, in the avant-garde 
visual art scene, he (like Stein) brings a sense of what is possible in other media but 
lagging in the lyric. His syntax and tone are signatures, but so is his noticeable lack of a 
signature I through which to rein in the scattershot voices of his progressively more 
chaotic cultural environment. Less traumatized and more curious than Eliot in the 
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company of the fracturing self, Ashbery deputizes his fragments and sends them out into 
the world to report on what is being said, whether in academic lecture halls, art 
magazines, or advertising jingles.  
In an interview with New York Quarterly in 1972, it is suggested to Ashbery that 
many of his poems relate the effect of “talking things out, of trying to say things in a lot 
of different ways,” to which he replies, “Yes, ‘the madness to explain’ that I mentioned in 
one poem. And not only the talking things out but the hopelessness of actually doing 
this.” This modification (that his poems are not only enacting a conversational attempt 
to “talk things out,” but that the inevitable impossibility of the very pursuit is essential 
to his poetics) helps to illuminate a central theme that runs through Self-Portrait in a 
Convex Mirror: representation, with all of its idealized aesthetic potential to 
communicate, contains in its mechanisms the very “spars” that make pure or “complete” 
communication impossible. The anxiety of attempting communication and expression 
fuels his many tangentially related conceits and meditations, ultimately working 
towards a qualified acceptance of limitation in opposition to silence or despair.  
As Postmodern as his distrust of communication is, in the same New York 
Quarterly interview Ashbery casually admits, “All my stuff is romantic poetry.” Though 
his mouth may well be curling towards a smile as he says this, the cognizance of (and 
resultant self-consciousness about) his place in a literary tradition pushes Ashbery, as 
he’s done before, to look back at his forbearers. Considering Parmigianino’s self-portrait 
central to his poem, Ashbery immediately begins to qualify and interrogate the artfully 
distorted attempt at self-representation, describing it as “the reflection once removed” 
and seeing in it a restlessness he attributes to the artist’s confined soul. Part of the 
confinement comes from the codependency of art’s experiential promise. A painting, as 
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a form of visual communication, is incomplete as an isolated surface. It is only 
completed in its viewing. Similarly, a poem can only be completed in its reading or an 
apostrophe only completed in its reception. The dialogical ideal of shared experience 
(manifest and transmitted through art) leaves the soul “kept / In suspension, unable to 
advance much farther / Than your look.”  
This reliance on the other begs for a shared connection, an objective point of 
contact through which true, essential, Romantic communication (as sought by Ashbery, 
despite its impossibility) is hunted. Whereas Prufrock’s detention in his own head 
causes anxiety and dread—as he’s still sublimely close to the dream of the full self—
Ashbery’s desire for pure communication seems more wistful. Certainly, there is a 
sadness underlying lost dreams of communicating. If no longer an outright crisis, at the 
very least the notion of a restless, pitiful, captive soul bound in its artistic expression 
sets up a depressing proposition. Looking at the painting (and therefore, we extrapolate, 
broader notions of art, representation, self-mythologizing, etc.), Ashbery says, “It is life 
englobed.” With Ashbery’s characteristic interchangeability of pronouns, the antecedent 
of “it” here (which will be amplified to a crescendo of its later in the poem) is open 
enough to be provocative. The referent is further removed when the “globe,” ostensibly 
referring to the convex mirror used by Parmigianino, starts to take on less literal 
implications. “One would like to stick one’s hand / Out of the globe, but its dimension, / 
what carries it, will not allow it.” The dimension of the mirror, or the very characteristic 
that enables the “great art,” is the same characteristic that prohibits a connection 
outside of its borders.  
This self-prohibiting feature of art is furthered with the image of light, specifically 
a “perverse light whose / imperative of subtlety dooms in advance its / conceit to light 
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up.” The notion of self-dooming pursuits, terrifying enough when limited to artistic 
expression, begins to take on a broader existential terror when applied beyond the form 
of art to the realm of general human experience and communication. Following this 
trajectory unchecked, we readers would be shot straight into nihilistic defeat, saying to 
ourselves, “Communication is simply not possible, representation is a hoax. Go home 
and put this book in the outhouse so it has some value. Good night.” But Ashbery, as is 
his wont, amends his trajectory.  
Deciding that there is no soul after all, that the artist’s eyes show only surface, 
Ashbery then decides that “the surface is what’s there / And nothing can exist except 
what’s there,” uncannily voicing a Jamesonian description of a depthless, mirroring 
“intertextuality” that problematizes affect and emotional resonance. Richard Stamelman 
describes the poem as:  
an ekphrastic re-presentation of Parmigianino’s self-portrait and at the same 
 time a radical criticism of the illusions and deceptions inherent in forms of 
 traditional representation that insist on the ideal, essential, and totalized nature 
 of the copied images they portray. Whereas portraiture has consistently been 
 regarded as a “meditation on likeness,” in Ashbery’s hands it becomes a 
 meditation on difference. (608) 
Resigning her/himself to the surfaced nature, the speaker admits this difference, 
the loss of the ideal, “Even though it seems likely that each of us / Knows what it is and 
is capable of / Communicating it to the other.” By relinquishing the dream of complete 
knowledge and pure communication, one can “Push forward ignoring the apparent / 
Naïveté of the attempt, not caring / that no one is listening.” One can’t be complete, 
can’t experience everything. And here, in the gallery of promised, impossible ideals, 
22 
 
Ashbery turns on Parmigianino, suggesting that we should take these gestures of 
mimicry, of “aping naturalness,” and use them as kindling.  
Accepting, or at least grumpily acknowledging, the inevitability of self-mythology 
and the incomplete self, the Postmodern self can let go of the ideal of comprehensive 
life—that just the right sunset or walk in the garden can make one complete. “Each 
person / has one big theory to explain the universe / but it doesn’t tell the whole story.” 
Forgetting the whole story, we can focus on “the peculiar slant” of light (evoking 
Dickinson’s “Tell the truth…”). The Romantic idealist, “imagining / He had a say in the 
matter,” awakens in the perpetual and inescapable present, the “recurring wave of 
arrival,” where “one is always cresting into one’s present,” which is “the present we are 
always escaping from / And falling back into.” 
The recurring wave of arrival that more or less keeps us perpetually in the present 
is in direct conversation with Fredric Jameson’s claim that a troubling characteristic of 
postmodernism is its lack of a sense of history. In Modern Poetry after Modernism, 
James Longenbach argues: 
Just as Eliot wanted to see a dynamic interchange between tradition and the 
 individual talent (‘the present only, keeps the past alive,’ said Eliot), Ashbery is 
 interested in the past only inasmuch as it is continuously modified by innovation. 
 Art emerges from this argument not as a singular achievement but as an ongoing 
 process of discovery: to move forward, it will accept whatever it can use. (88) 
As we travel through Ashbery’s lines—which, separated from narrative time, 
enact a recurring wave of arrival, sometimes enjambment by enjambment—we follow a 
mind moving forward into the Postmodern world of surfaces and no history, while 
simultaneously suffering the pull of the past. It is important, though, to distinguish 
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between 1) a reluctant departure from long-held beliefs about the nature of subjectivity 
and communication, and 2) someone giving up on the idea of inter-subjective 
communication at all. When he notices that the painted eye contains no soul, just the 
surface coating of paint, he acknowledges that we have no soul to hand another, only the 
medium of expression at hand. The illusion of the soul is rendered by a dot of light 
paint, approximating the sparkle in an eye. So too are our words coarse approximations 
of some intangible interior. The painting is a vehicle for something that cannot be 
viewed, cannot be touched, so we’re left with the paint, with the words. Reminiscent of 
the move from figurative mimicry in painting to an abstraction that foregrounds the 
materiality of the medium, Ashbery’s simultaneous use uses the of pronouns and the 
resultant confusion of indeterminacy suggests both the impossibility of direct, 
meaningful Postmodern connection and his tenacious insistence on attempting 
connection nonetheless. Ashbery argues: 
[My work is] often criticized for a failure to communicate, but I take issue with 
 this; my intention is to communicate and my feeling is that a poem that 
 communicates something that’s already known by the reader is not 
 communicating anything to him and in fact shows a lack of respect (NYQ). 
Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror captures some of Ashbery’s more contemplative 
poems, and foregrounds aspects of his Postmodernist thinking. More representative of 
Ashbery’s meandering line than the title poem, and more directly in discourse with 
some of Eliot’s work, is a poem like “Hop o’ My Thumb”: 
 The grand hotels, dancing girls 
 Urge forward under a veil of “lost illusion” 
 The deed to this day or some other day. 
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 There is no day in the calendar 
 The dairy company sent out 
 That lets you possess it wildly like 
 The body of a dreaming woman in a dream: 
 All flop over at the top when seized, 
 The stem too slender, the top too loose and heavy, 
 Blushing with fine foliage of dreams. 
 The motor cars, tinsel hats, 
 Supper of cakes, the amorous children 
 Take the solitary downward path of dreams 
 And are not seen again. 
 What is it, Undine? 
 The notes now can scarcely be heard 
 In the hubbub of the flattening storm, 
 With the third wish unspoken. 
 
 I remember meeting you in a dark dream 
 Of April, you or some girl, 
 The necklace of wishes alive and breathing around your throat. 
 In the blindness of the dark whose 
 Brightness turned to sand salt-glazed in noon sun 
 We could not know each other or know which part 
 Belonged to the other, pelted in an electric storm of rain. 
 Only gradually the mounds that meant our bodies 
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 That wore our selves concaved into view 
 But intermittently as through dark mist 
 Smeared against fog. No worse time to have come, 
 Yet all was desiring though already desired and past, 
 The moment a monument to itself 
 No one would ever see or know was there. 
 
 That time faded too and the night 
 Softened to smooth spirals or foliage at night. 
 There were sleeping cabins near by, blind lanterns, 
 Nocturnal friendliness of the plate of milk left for the fairies 
 Who otherwise might be less well disposed: 
 Friendship of white sheets patched with milk. 
 And always an open darkness in which on ename 
 Cries over and over again: Ariane! Ariane! 
 Was it for this you led your sisters back from sleep 
 And now he of the blue beard has outmaneuvered you? 
 But for the best perhaps: let 
 Those sisters slink into the sapphire 
 Hair that is mounting day. 
 There are still other made-up countries 
 Where we can hide forever, 
 Wasted with eternal desire and sadness, 
 Sucking the sherbets, crooning the tunes, naming the names. 
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Using the name of a French folktale (involving a resourceful little scamp who 
tricks an ogre into murdering its own children), “Hop o’ My Thumb” stands as an 
interesting successor and counterpoint to Eliot’s allusion-rich constructions. The title 
may lead a reader to approach the poem with certain expectations, none of which are 
likely to be met in the text. Enough thematic repetition enters to suggest unified 
movement (“Undine,” referencing a German fairytale; “Ariane,” the French variant of 
Ariadne, who led Theseus from the minotaur and traveled to Hades only to drown, 
alone; “the plate of milk left for the fairies”), but it’s hard to read it as a poem essentially 
“about” fairytales, or “about” anything. Mixed in with myth and folklore are motor cars 
and sherbets. Milk seems to reappear, as do dreams, but what do we make of this? Also 
stirred in are moments of casual uncertainty (“this day or some other day,” “you or some 
girl,” “we could not know each other or know which part / Belonged to the other”) and 
hints of the more philosophical tone of “Self-Portrait” (“The moment a monument to 
itself”). One could posit readings. The poem itself is perhaps representing a labyrinthine 
puzzle, one in which the reader is left calling out, “Ariane! Ariane!” There is a 
connection to the character, Hop o’ My Thumb, who left trails of string and bread 
crumbs to keep from getting lost. Perhaps the dreams referenced throughout are hints 
that the poem itself is a dream, or dreamlike. Perhaps the inability to know each other or 
know which part belonged to the other is an ars poetica? Any of these could be true, or 
partially true, but it seems impossible that any are comprehensively true. “The Waste 
Land” certainly requires a suspension of one’s urges to traditionally “make sense” of a 
poem, but it seems to invite a reader to make the connections, revealing a deeper 
underlying meaning. “Hop o’ My Thumb,” on the other hand, seems to invite a reader to 
give up on searching for the code to deeper underlying meanings. The syntax is neither 
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as experimental as Stein’s nor as “poetic” as Eliot’s, and the seemingly straightforward 
nature of his lines has a strange effect. Perloff argues that with Ashbery, as with 
Rimbaud, “the reader understands what is being said but not what is being talked 
about” (Poetics, 59). 
As part of his grand plan to defamiliarize, Ashbery regularly introduces 
conventionally “unpoetic” objects onto the page to see how the framing of “poetry” 
might affect its reception. In Radical Artifice, Perloff compares this feature of Ashbery’s 
work to the readymade art most associated with Marcel Duchamp. Duchamp—in 
presenting quotidian or “vulgar” objects (such as a snow shovel for “In advance of the 
broken arm” and, most notoriously, a urinal for “Fountain”) to the consecrated art altar 
of the gallery—challenged not only how viewers regarded the space of the gallery (and 
thus the definition of art), but also how they regarded the mundane objects in their 
unconsecrated contexts. Focusing on Ashbery’s “Lecture on the Weather,” Perloff posits:  
If the readymade is an ‘ordinary’ industrial object, the ‘lecture on the weather’ is a 
 fabricated, simulated natural event. If the readymade turns a useful object  
 (urinal, bicycle wheel, snow shovel, bottle rack) into an impersonal work of art,  
 the ‘lecture’ on weather turns the simulated event into one that behaves like a real 
 one, causing the audience to take shelter from the cruel elements. Finally, if the 
 readymade was appropriate to its modernist moment, a witty critique of ‘high art’ 
 pieties and of prejudices in the early twentieth century, works like Lecture on the 
 Weather are nothing if not appropriate to our moment, calling into question as 
 they do our preoccupation with the lecture format—not only university lecture, of 
 course, but any ‘address’ A makes to B and C, whether on radio or TV, whether 
 formal political address or the promotion of a new cosmetic product. (27) 
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By defamiliarizing the sense of what belongs in a poem, Ashbery expands the 
possibilities of the art-form and the possibilities for the speaking I beyond the breeching 
containment of Eliot’s Prufrock or the underlying narrative connections between 
references in “The Waste Land.” Perhaps his most identifiable move is the shifting use of 
pronouns, resulting in an indefinite sense of who is speaking, or how many. Perloff 
suggests, “There may be a number of characters in his poems; on the other hand, ‘I,’ 
‘we,’ and ‘you’ may well refer to the poet himself” (Poetics, 12). Perloff goes on to suggest 
that this decision distances Ashbery from Eliot: “To use, as does Ashbery, shifting 
pronouns and false causal connectives is itself an implicit commentary on the nature of 
identity and causality. Here intertextual relationships become especially important: we 
read an Ashbery against an Eliot or an Auden” (34). Longenbach pushes back against an 
absolute distancing of the two poets, arguing: 
 Even if [Ashbery’s] poems seem (to those who accept postmodernism’s 
 progressive narratives) more “advanced” than Eliot’s—more open to demotic 
 language, more accommodating to popular culture, more suspicious of the lyric’s 
 unified voice—the poems are nonetheless unthinkable without Eliot’s example. 
 (88) 
Again, as useful as it is, I’m challenging Perloff’s distancing here to suit my own 
purposes. Tracing the exteriorizing trend of subjectivities from Romanticism to the 
present day, Eliot breaks important new ground and Ashbery opens it further. Moving 
from “Prufrock” to “The Waste Land,” Eliot splits the Romantic I into a You and I before 
expanding it to the peripheral ghosts of an exterior world. He also casts a much broader 
net for references and lets the references enter abruptly and leave without warning. 
Ashbery continues both of these complications. Eliot’s I, You, and the Third becomes I, 
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You, Her, Him, and It. The disjunction of Eliot’s sources is increased in Ashbery also. 
Sometimes line by line, the speaker, setting, and “plot” of the poem are mysteries.  
Refusing even nostalgia for the stable I, Ashbery challenges the reader to receive a poem 
in an unfamiliar way. As Longenbach suggests, “An increased self-consciousness about 
the rhetoric of authenticity should free us to explore a wider variety of rhetorical 
stances” (Modern Poetry, 100). 
 As Postmodernism privileges surfaces over essences and splintered distances 
over unified proximity, Ashbery’s poetry is hoping to use his self-conscious skepticism 
about authenticity to approach new rhetorical stances without reverting to an inward-
cycling solipsism. Dagmar Martha Zuefle argues: 
   Ashbery is left wanting to affirm the poet’s constructs but aware of the  
  fictionality of these constructs and the subsequent pitfalls of isolation and  
  solipsism. He deals with this potential impasse by exploring the moment  
  between creation and decreation (and between decreation and creation)  
  […] As systems are either coming into being or being destroyed, he   
  ponders whether the poet’s role is to participate actively in the   
  creation/destruction or to remain passively in a state of receptivity,   
  recording (however faultily) the acts of creating and destroying. (10- 
  11) 
 Caught between the poles of active/passive, creation/destruction, 
earnestness/irony, Romantic/Postmodern, self/others, Ashbery often attempts to have 
his cake and eat it too by transcending the dichotomous paradoxes. Liminality, then, 
becomes essential to Ashbery’s poetics. 
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 In his chameleon mobility of identities and reference, Ashbery speaks to the 
difficulty of autonomous cognition in the polyphony of voices surrounding the late 
twentieth-century artist-citizen. But, incorrigible Postmodern Romantic that he is, the 
poetic wrangling of these disparate, slippery voices often dares Ashbery to elucidate, or 
at least point towards the possibility of, a greater whole. Lawrence Kramer argues: 
  Because they almost never identify their subjects, Ashbery’s poems   
  affiliate themselves with each other more readily than they do with reality.  
  Read together, they appear to join seamlessly into a single, endlessly fertile 
  meditation. Every utterance thereby becomes a momentary reflection—a  
  synecdoche, a potential center—of an instated visionary whole. (337-338) 
Reminiscent of Eliot’s juggling hands in “The Waste Land,” Ashbery’s consistent use of 
an inconsistent speaker allows for an overarching connection that manages to maintain 
a recognizable poetic “voice” while conjuring and conducting distinct, detached “voices.” 
Grace Schulman argues that, “confounded by surface impressions, [Ashbery] sought to 
achieve wholeness of self by isolating a fragment of sensory experience” (“To Create the 
Self”). Schulman also suggests that Ashbery’s poetry is “based on genuine vision and on 
revelation through clouds of distress and exile,” and that, after his meditations in “Self-
Portrait in a Convex Mirror,” Ashbery’s speaker looks around at the world and “sees its 
fragment made whole by the creative act.” She references, too, Ashbery himself, who 
says in Three Poems:  
  Yet so blind are we to the true nature of reality at any given moment that  
  this chaos—bathed, it is true, in the iridescent hues of the rainbow and  
  clothed in an  endless confusion of fair and variegated forms which did  
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  their best to stifle any burgeoning notions of the formlessness of the  
  whole…this chaos began to seem  like the normal way of being…. (59) 
While I think that Ashbery’s polyphonic world, in enacting the chaos that seems like the 
normal way of being, relates more of the crisis of contemporary amalgamated 
consciousness than is implied in the snippets from Kramer and Schulman, I do agree 
that the crisis itself stems from the relationship between the fragment and the whole. In 
Ashbery’s case, then, the liminal space he seeks is one that can move between the daily 
fragment and the surface noise towards some prolonged depth or unification of being, 
succumbing fully to neither.  
 Ultimately, beyond aesthetic concerns of craft and general engagement, 
Ashbery’s underlying impulse seems to be an attempt at making multiple realms one, to 
condense the multitudes and fashion a channel through which to communicate with 
another person amid the ringing din of the divergent seas. 
 In a time of globalization—when voices, nations, and people are in ever-closer 
proximity and co-dependence—the idea of discrete, essential identities seem more and 
more mythological (or at least remarkable, worthy of a case study). These at-least-
partially-mythologized identities are, in turn, often referenced for either political gain or 
commercial commodification. In such a world, transcending murky, imposed identities 
in order to locate and isolate one’s authentic “self” seems an increasingly noble and 
unlikely proposition. In a (sort of) post-Romantic and (kind of) post-Modern poetic 
landscape, wherein religious rewards have been displaced by crises of orientation, those 
hoping to exert influence over their subjecthood have a hard road to hoe. This difficulty 
in negotiating prescribed binaries—the conventional and the transcendental; the chaotic 
and the quotidian; the I, You, and We—can be dismissed as obscurantist or opaque, but, 
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as Charles Altieri argues, “The point is not that language fails but that language succeeds 
by bringing us to a sense of its inherent limitations” (114). 
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3. Translation as Necromancy: Hawkey, Robinson, and the 
Between Voice 
 
—with an introduction by Jack Spicer— 
 
 
 
 Just as Gertrude Stein makes for an interesting pairing for Eliot, with her 
drastically different style, so too is Jack Spicer a curious partner for Ashbery. Though 
Spicer died a decade before Self-Portrait in a Convex Mirror would be published, he 
was only two years older than Ashbery. Determinedly loyal to his status as a Bay Area 
resident, Spicer is far away from Ashbery in terms of both geography and scene; yet, in 
Perloff’s league, he would certainly choose Team Rimbaud (he even wrote “A Fake Novel 
about the Life of Arthur Rimbaud”), and thus Team Ashbery. He is certainly 
innovative—playfully, fearlessly so—but his eccentric poetics contain strong classical 
echoes of the muse and the oracular force of inspired dictation. 
 Identifiably Romantic in its pursuit of possession by a greater artistic force, 
Spicer’s dedication to dictation nevertheless demonstrates pronounced post-Romantic 
characteristics. In 1965, he gave the first of a series of lectures in Vancouver on what 
would have been Yeats’ 100th birthday. He began by describing the old Irish medium’s 
automatic writing as being “the first thing since Blake on the business of taking poetry 
as coming from the outside rather than from the inside.” Yeats is exemplary of Spicer’s 
idea that poetry is beyond the self, that “instead of the poet being a beautiful machine 
which manufactured the current itself, did everything for itself—almost a perpetual 
motion machine of emotion until the poet’s heart broke or it was burned on the beach 
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like Shelley’s—instead there was something from the Outside coming in” (The House 
that Jack Built, 5). 
 As an example of this phenomenon, Spicer references Cocteau’s Orphée, wherein 
lyrical lines are delivered to a poet via the radio of a supernatural automobile. This 
conceit—of the transmitter, conduit, host poet—is central to Spicer’s poetics. While his 
insistence, signaturely stubborn, that the poet’s role as a conduit is more or less 
unqualified may seem willfully and simplistically absolute, he’s quick to point out that 
our social and cultural “furniture”—our idiosyncrasies of language, our personal and 
collective memories, our world’s current dramas—necessarily influence the form of our 
dictated poems. The Martians, after all, wouldn’t find speaking through us in an alien 
tongue particularly useful when it came time for us to effectively receive the message. As 
Spicer puts it, “If you have a cleft palate and are trying to speak with the tongues of men 
and angels, you’re going to still speak through a cleft palate. And the poem comes 
distorted through the things which are in you” (House, 7-8).  
 In a typically off-handed and provocative metaphor, Spicer illustrates the 
importance he sees in writing a poem without diverting attention to the connections that 
may be forming by claiming that “you have to kill your animal before you stuff it, and 
looking at it is the stuffing of it” (23).  
 The first book to employ his eccentric methods was After Lorca. Published in 
1957, it is ostensibly introduced by Federico Garcia Lorca, who died in 1936. Spicer, via 
Lorca’s prosthetic voice, explains the project:  
  It must be made clear at the start that these poems are not translations. In  
  even the most literal of them Mr. Spicer seems to derive pleasure in   
  inserting or substituting one or two words which completely change the  
35 
 
  mood and often the  meaning of the poem as I had written it. More often  
  he takes one of my poems and adjoins to half of it another half of his own,  
  giving rather the effect of an unwilling centaur. (Modesty forbids me to  
  speculate which end of the animal is mine.) Finally, there are an almost  
  equal number of poems that I did not write at all (one supposes they must  
  be his) executed in a somewhat fanciful imitation of my early style. The  
  reader is given no indication which of the poems belongs to which   
  category, and I have further complicated the problem (with malice   
  aforethought I must admit) by sending Mr. Spicer several poems written  
  after my death which he has also translated and included here. Even the  
  most faithful  student of my work will be hard put to decide what is and  
  what is not Garcia Lorca as, indeed, he would if he were to look into my  
  present resting place. The analogy is impolite, but I fear the impoliteness is 
  deserved. (After Lorca, 107) 
 The book itself is made of two distinct sorts of poems: “translations” of Lorca 
poems dedicated to friends (including an inspired gesture—enacting the postmodern 
translator’s muddled “self”—wherein he dedicates one translation “for Jack Spicer”); 
and four epistolary poems addressed to Lorca himself.  
 The second letter, a typical amalgamation of confessional disclosure and sure-
hearted poetics, begins: 
   Dear Lorca,  
   When I translate one of your poems and I come across words I do  
  not understand, I always guess at their meanings. I am inevitably right. A  
  really perfect poem (no one yet has written one) could be perfectly   
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  translated by a person who did not know one word of the language it was  
  written in. A really perfect poem has an infinitely small vocabulary.  
   It is very difficult. We want to transfer the immediate object, the  
  immediate emotion of the poem—and yet the immediate always has  
  hundreds of its own words clinging to it, short-lived and tenacious as  
  barnacles. And it is wrong to scrape them off and substitute others. A poet  
  is a time mechanic not an embalmer. The words around the immediate  
  shrivel and decay like flesh around the body. Objects, words must be led  
  across time not preserved against it. 
The letters’ blending of ironic, unabashed formal cleverness and revealingly melancholic 
earnestness resonates with Ashbery’s work and help point a way forward for poets, 
raised on Postmodernism, who hope to take both conceptual and emotional risks. 
Predicting Hawkey, the third letter in After Lorca ends: 
  Even these letters. They correspond with something (I don’t know what)  
  that you have written (perhaps as unapparently as that lemon corresponds 
  to this piece of seaweed) and, in turn, some future poet will write   
  something which corresponds to them. That is how we dead men write  
  each to each other. 
 Spicer’s collaboration with a dead man, playful as it may seen, is serious in its 
challenge to the assumptions of a stable I. Innovative lyrical poetry has allowed its 
writers to interrogate the I that we take for granted; to translate subjectivity beyond the 
stable I of traditional, authoritative expression or narration. This translation of the 
speaking subject is engaged even more nontraditionally by Christian Hawkey in 
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Ventrakl. Like Spicer, Hawkey utilizes the inherent complications of translation to enter 
a muddled netherspace between living poet and dead, “translated” poet.  
 Ventrakl, willfully embraces cross-cultural ignorance, appropriation, 
collaboration, and methodological experimentation in order to disrupt the inviolability 
of authorial ownership. In his introduction, Hawkey describes the project, published in 
2010, as “a collaboration with the German poet Georg Trakl, who died in 1914” (6). 
Picking up threads left by After Lorca, Hawkey uses source material left by Trakl to 
instigate an inventive attack on the idea of authorial ownership. According to Hawkey: 
   Our bodies, our heads, our skulls, the holes in our bodies and skulls are  
  voice chambers, sound chambers, wherein our own voiced selves and the  
  voiced selves  of others constantly enter and exit, and are changed by our  
  bodies upon entrance, exit. Consciousness, at least metonymically, is  
  voiced, and the voice, as Mladen Dolar has suggested, is less a vehicle for  
  “self-presence” than a void, a blank space at the site of intersection. (5) 
To ensure that his new “collaborative” text was sufficiently defamaliarized—moved far 
enough away from the recognitions in both Trakl’s source text and his own idiosyncratic 
poetic voice— Hawkey implemented a series of restraints, removals, and chance 
operations. As he explains: 
  Sometimes, inspired by a procedure invented by the poet David Cameron,  
  I typed into Microsoft Word a Trakl poem in German and used the spell  
  check program to produce an initial draft. Other strategies involved typing  
  the poem into an online translation engine and then translating the poem  
  back and forth, line by line, between English and German; or shooting,  
  with a 12 gauge, an open Trakl book from a distance of ten feet, then  
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  translating, with a dictionary, a remaining page of perforated text. Still  
  other poems were generated by working from a book of Trakl’s poems  
  which I had left outside to decompose over a full year in a glass jar filled  
  with rainwater and leaves and mosquito larvae until its pages, over time,  
  dissolved into words, pieces of words, word-stems, floating up and   
  rearranging themselves on the surface of the jar. (8) 
 Hawkey argues, “To read a poem is to allow a text and its voiced accents (timbres, 
tonations) to unfold within one’s reading voice, thereby forming a loop, a voice-over—a 
between voice” (6). 
 Examining one of his homophonic translations, we witness Hawkey’s balancing 
act between the danger of defamiliarizing language past the point of coherence—a la 
speaking in tongues—and the danger of over-directing the translation toward meaning. 
  
 Dust Rounds  
 
 I saw dust mites lurch through deserted rooms. 
 I saw a tungsten-blue blossom on her sternum. 
 
 A plot licks stillness. Dumbness fevers 
 The last albumen effigies of a miniature world. 
 
 Only geese with kindness shimmer 
 And, once blasted, fall in red blurts. 
 
 Down a loneliness-stick inner spangles 
 Issue tears, and we in unguent failure 
 
 Are drawn to this spinsterish ant-light. 
 Note, for example, the red eyes of sumptuous porters. 
 
 The orphans shouting at fences. How they glisten, 
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 At night, with the dimwit mien of an alien order. 
 
 As with “The Waste Land,” the poem may at first seem to be an arbitrary mess. 
Surveying all of the homophonic translations, however, a lexicon starts to be 
established. Within the twenty homophonic translations, the word “voles” appears seven 
times, as does the word “orphan”; “sternum” appears six times; “ants,” “mittens,” and 
“gelatin” each appear three times, etc. While still erring on the side of unintelligibility 
when compared to the classical allusions of Eliot, Hawkey is clearly not handing over 
meaning-making duties to a purely random device. I’m not including any source texts, 
since Hawkey doesn’t include them as part of the project, but I imagine that strictly 
following one’s ear would likely lead to less syntactically complete lines. With some 
words, such as “orphan” and “sternum” relating to motifs Trakl actually used, Hawkey 
seems to prefer a challenge over dogmatic rigidity. Beginning a poem titled “Dust 
Rounds” with the arresting image of dust mites lurching through deserted rooms, 
Hawkey manages more initial thematic consistency than “Hop o’ my Thumb.” With 
provocative objects such as “the last albumen effigies of a miniature world,” the “dimwit 
mien of an alien order,” and “spinsterish ant-light,” he moves beyond purely reactive 
sound games. Indeed, a couplet such as “Only geese with kindness shimmer / And, once 
blasted, fall in red blurts” could sound at home in any number of less conceptual pieces. 
By “collaborating” with Trakl, Hawkey chooses to trouble his agency, not remove it.  
 Picking away at the I, Hawkey brings it towards thinghood in a way recognizable 
in Language Poetics decades earlier; but he maintains the empathetic intimacy of a 
speaking I while simultaneously defamiliarizing the autonomous monovocality we’ve 
come to expect. Language Poetry was, in some ways, the extreme logical apex of the urge 
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towards de-authoring, deconstructing, or dispersing a coherent, expressive I. 
Implementing radically de-subjectifying methodologies, some Language Poets would 
use oblique strategy exercises, random-number generators, or other non-intuitive 
mechanical means to attack the assumed necessity of subjective influence. Though 
somewhat reminiscent of surrealist parlor games or OULIPO prompts, Language Poets 
generally veered away from the playful, generative spirit of surrealism and toward a 
more theoretical fidelity.  
 In his collection of critical essays on language poetries, The Marginalization of 
Poetry, Bob Pereleman provides a handy periodizing summary of the Language Poets’ 
context: 
 The aesthetics of [the] mainstream are not without variation, but generalizations 
 are possible, and were certainly made, polemically, by those involved in the 
 formation of language writing: the mainstream poet guarded a highly distinct 
 individuality; while craft and literary knowledge contributed to poetry, sensibility 
 and intuition reigned supreme. The mainstream poet was not an intellectual and 
 especially not a theoretician. Hostility to analysis and, later, to theory, were 
 constitutive of such a poetic stance. In this situation, modernism was no longer 
 especially important. (12) 
While the easiest traits and reductions of modernist poets were maintained, Perelman 
argues, “the more basic facts of modernism were shunned. The poet as engaged, 
oppositional intellectual, and poetic form and syntax as sites of experiment for political 
and social purposes—these would not be found”(12). 
 Perelman points out that the Language Poets were not uniform in their 
aesthetics, had sharp contradictions, and didn’t always even have the banner of a name 
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retroactively applied to many of its members. These are all traits shared with 
Modernism (à la Perloff’s divided lineage). While modernism was opposed to Victorian 
excess and its written manifestation as neoclassical verbiage, Language Poetry was 
opposed to institutionalized academic post-confessional individualist epiphany poem. 
 Perloff quotes Ashbery as admitting, “I guess I don’t have a very strong sense of 
my own identity and I find it very easy to move from one person in the sense of a 
pronoun to another and this again helps to produce a kind of polyphony in my poetry 
which I again feel is a means toward greater naturalism” (63). So Ashbery, the author of 
self-described Romantic poetry, is trying to move toward greater naturalism. Hawkey, in 
possessing/being possessed by a dead man, is attempting to denature the “natural” 
processes of collaboration and generation. If Ashbery’s work in the 1970s worked 
increasingly toward surfacing—letting the medium of the art (paint, words, etc.) be 
foregrounded rather than an implied depth of “soul” or innate “poetic” meaning—the 
Language Poets achieved as near a surfacing as one could imagine, and now the 
Contemporary Postmodernists are searching for ways to reintroduce human subjectivity 
without compromising the hard-won elasticity of perspective afforded by earlier 
Postmodern innovators. Even if the methodological eccentricity of Hawkey’s project 
seems a direct borrowing from certain Language Poetics, he noticeably errs on the side 
of “poetic” meaning-making, atmospheric construction, and identifiable voice. 
 Clearly in conversation with After Lorca (Hawkey even cites Spicer’s line from 
the introduction: “The dead are notoriously hard to satisfy”), Ventrakl is a bigger and 
messier project. At 149 pages, it is three times longer than its predecessor. As compared 
to the two main types of poems implemented in After Lorca, Ventrakl contains 
homophonic translations, ruminative responses (often in prose) to photographs, literal 
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translations, a chronology, color-themed centos, diagrams, séance interviews, lists, 
quotes from others (Benjamin, Spicer, et al), and elaborate dictionary entries. The 
collage of poem types (the ekphrastic role of the photographs especially) represents a 
manifestation of Hawkey’s desire to move beyond subjects, forms, media, and the 
senses. 
 While less disruptive of each sentence’s stand-alone intelligibility, Hawkey’s 
centos challenge the line-to-line intelligibility of the standard narrative poem. Consider 
his cento of Trakl’s references to the color white. 
   
 WHITETRAKL 
 
 A fountain sings. Clouds, white and tender along the edge of night, white birds 
 Fluttering up the wandering boy’s white nightgown. 
 A white stranger steps into the house. The city’s white walls keep ringing. 
 Softly a white night drifts in 
 And myrrh blooms silently over the white eyelids of the dead. We meet 
 With shepherds and white stars. We drink 
 The white waters of the pool. Mother even carries an infant in her white moon. 
 Yet more radiant is the white stranger, a white shirt made of stars, 
 Or, on a cold night, the white cheeks of sisters, their white eyebrows, white  
  heads. 
 
Less confrontational in its repetition than some of Stein’s more percussive pieces, the 
tension building between the disjointed, though often elliptically lyrical, enjambments 
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and the reliability of “white” on each line make for a more nuanced challenge to the 
epiphany poem. Not wholly dissimilar to the homophonic translations in the unexpected 
loveliness of some of the permutations, the centos more directly challenge Hawkey’s 
claim to authorship. In an era of internet mash-ups and music sampling, he assumes 
something of the role of editor—Pound to Eliot’s rhyming lines in “The Waste Land.” 
 Counter-intuitively, these gentle, occasionally lovely centos more fully engage the 
liminal space that all of our Postmodern poets seem to be seeking. What Hawkey refers 
to as “a between voice” or “a void, a blank space at the site of intersection,” poet and 
translator Johannes Goransson names “the Deformation Zone.” This liminal space of 
intersecting subjectivities (languages, contexts, etc.), opens up an arena wherein the 
speaking I is transformed, and so, too, the You.  
 But Hawkey’s experiments are not without their risks, and Ventrakl has received 
criticism for its assumptions and stated goals. In “Translation as Summoning: Christian 
Hawkey’s Ventrakl,” Brian Henry argues: 
  Trakl’s “power” is illusory, projected by Hawkey even if felt by him. Trakl  
  is not,  cannot be, holding a small a camera. He cannot be turning a lens  
  back onto the photographer. Hawkey’s gesture here, his desire to animate  
  Trakl, transfer authority to Trakl, or at least share authority with him, is  
  bound to fail, yet does so poignantly. 
Circling around the ideas of necessary failure and the impossibility of comprehensive 
objectivity (which are symptomatic of not only translation, I argue, but of Postmodern 
attempts at representation), Henry goes on to argue, “Ventrakl, then, is a book of 
holes—holes in biography, holes in the poems’ transference from one language to 
another, holes in the poems themselves (as when Hawkey apparently prepares a 
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translation with a shotgun).” In “Who Is Writing Is the Translator,” Paul Legault decides 
that, rather than holes, it is a book of interruptions, arguing, “Ventrakl is obsessed with 
the idea of translation (and its discontents). It interrupts itself so consistently with 
critical theory on the subject — not to mention archival photographs, imagined 
interviews, and poems — that you soon realize the book is entirely composed of 
interruptions.” Henry argues that the project “can seem more appropriation than 
collaboration. Aesthetically, some of Hawkey’s homophonic translations substitute a 
veneer of strangeness for real strangeness; rather than foreignize, they domesticate; 
rather than unsettle, they seem quite comfortable within the contemporary American 
poetic idiom.” 
 Indeed, Ventrakl is problematic. Though Hawkey challenges normative notions 
of authorship, collaboration, and translation, the book is part of the commercial world 
and sold as the work of one author. Regardless of its theoretical questioning of 
ownership of the “I,” Ventrakl is sold for money, under Hawkey’s name, and is gaining 
him the dubious “cultural capital” that comes from publishing a much-discussed book 
through a respected press. Still, despite its problems, Ventrakl offers a singular 
exploration of contemporary permission and cross-cultural, cross-generational 
meaning-making. 
 Part of this singularity comes from engagement with translation. Translation may 
seem simple enough, but the necessary non-interchangeability of languages insists on a 
translator’s use of creativity and, therefore, a blurring of the line between writers and an 
interrogation of how we make meaning and equate relationships between languages and 
people. In his translator’s notes to Aase Berg’s collection Remainland, Johannes 
Gorannson argues that, confronted with the difficulties of translation, “we are forced to 
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accept the possibility that all the words could mean more than we will ever find out—or 
they could all be sheer nonsense.” Though translation has been going on as long as 
distinct languages needed to cross their respective barriers, contemporary approaches to 
translation appear to offer this most postmodern of choices: profound subjective 
surfacing (the incomplete fragment) or “sheer nonsense.” Singular in its specifics, 
translation offers a microcosmic magnification of broader Postmodern concerns. 
Goransson closes his notes by claiming that “Berg’s poetry shows that everything is 
reference, everything is translation. She sets the entire language in motion, and shows 
how every language may be foreign, even to its native speakers.” This sense of 
defamiliarization is essential to transcending the static I of the commoditized self. 
Jameson argues: 
  My sense is that this is essentially a visual culture, wired for sound—but  
  one where the linguistic element (for which some stronger term that  
  “standardization” needs to be invented, and which is in addition marbled  
  by the worst kind of junk-language, such as “life-style” or “sexual   
  preference”) is slack and flabby, and not to be made interesting without  
  ingenuity, daring, and keen motivation. (299) 
 Hawkey’s project has its faults, which accompany its daring. Translation theorist 
Susan Bassnett describes the difficulty in categorizing even the process of translation, as 
some refer to it as an art, some a craft, some a science, and how “Horst Frenz even goes 
so far as to opt for ‘art’ but with qualifications, claiming that ‘translation is neither a 
creative art nor an imitative art, but stands somewhere between the two’” (Translation 
Studies, 14). This categorization itself enacts a mode of hierarchical commoditization 
wherein engagement with a piece of art is transformed into a productive action that 
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needs to have a systemic value placed upon it. An idea central to translation studies, that 
there is no real equivalence between languages, may help explain why translation (and 
methodologies playing with or partially adopting many of its ideas) allows for such 
innovation in the face of capitalistic attempts to singularize, name, and copyright the 
author or “owner” of a text. In capitalism—wherein money is omni-equivalent, 
everything’s value is quantitative in standard currencies—acknowledging the 
impossibility of such equivalencies is radically disruptive. 
 I’m interested in how Spicer and Hawkey willfully remove many of the checks 
traditionally employed for a “faithful” translation. By occupying the seat of a translator, 
they both adopt a number of complicating methodological constraints and take cultural 
and aesthetic risks. In both After Lorca and Ventrakl, the authors divest themselves of 
clear, non-collaborative autonomy and, in collaborating with dead poets, investigate 
how faux/restrained translation projects can singularly challenge normative ideas of 
authorial ownership.  
 Wordsworth largely did away with the You of a beloved in his investigations of 
personal memory, concerning himself mostly with a younger William Wordsworth. Eliot 
continued the Romantic turn inward, swallowing the You, and began confusing the You 
with the I, allowing for the interiorizing to begin a move away from a contained essence. 
Ashbery continued this continuation, scattering the pronouns to the winds. Spicer, and 
then more so Hawkey, adopted Eliot’s interiorization of the I as well as its split, but—in 
their “collaborations”—created a second self, the split You, which mirrored the 
interiorized complication. By addressing their dead collaborators, they are addressing 
themselves through the ventriloquism of the Other, conflated with the I. They are 
doubling the I by taking on a “partner.” By unraveling the boundaries of singular 
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authorship, they are bringing the I into the You. The You, also, as in Buber’s theory of 
intersubjective co-dependence, is bringing in the I. We could call this the We Formula. 
When the internalized I and You are no longer mere anxious aspects of self, as in Eliot’s 
Eliots, but give over autonomy to another (if dead) author, the entire apostrophe is 
restructured. Even when Ashbery explodes the speaking I of his poems into plural 
pronouns, there is still the assumption that one John Ashbery is behind the plurals. 
When Hawkey conflates himself with Georg Trakl, when the source of a text is 
impossible to isolate, a new layer of assumption is disputed. An exponential furthering 
of Eliot’s Modernist, fragmented self, the Contemporary Postmodern self, translated and 
collaborated beyond easy identification, contains fragments surrounding fragments 
surrounding fragments.  
 Of course, Hawkey’s way is not the only way to complicate collaboration with the 
dead. Elizabeth Robinson, in her book Also Known As, initiates contact with the work of 
the Portuguese poet Fernando Pessoa. In Robinson’s words, “I was curious here to 
explore the opportunities and limitations of persona(e): it is widely known that Pessoa 
himself wrote under a series of ‘heteronyms.’ Thus I undertook to write in the persona of 
an author who was himself writing under the guise of multiple personae.” As she 
theorizes in the poem “Anti-Anatomical Conclusion, or Stealing the Trespass from the 
Thief”: 
  One might pick a lock and that’s a way to blur the doorway’s sense of 
  exterior and interior. Someone is breathing, there, in unsecured space. 
  Pursuing the free movement of air through these passages, 
  while the air, without remark, generates 
  itself. Lung’s moist reception. 
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Though less “collaborative” in its textual appropriation and less literal in its handling of 
the source material than Hawkey’s project, Robinson, surrounding herself with mirrors 
and installing mirrors inside of her mirrors, is shattering the 1:1, I:I notion of persona 
and inviting its void to occupy an unsecured space. When personae are impersonating 
personae of personae, who’s to tell which mirror is reflecting which reflection of which 
reflection? Eventually, the source of the reflection becomes indistinguishable from all of 
the resultant replications, distortions, and multiplying forms. The I becomes the You 
becomes the We becomes “Elizabeth Robinson” becomes “Elizabeth Robinson-as-
Pessoa,” etc. The very act of naming is essential here. In “Alias Revisited,” Robinson 
asks, “What kind of marking is made on the air / between two bodies // when a name is 
re-formed to it?” When each image, reflection or no, gets a name and a voice, we may 
start to approach a Lauterbachian land of complete fragments. Never one to shy away 
from the Method school of poetry, Elizabeth signed my copy of Also Known As thusly: 
     For BJ 
     with most 
     warm regards 
      from 
          Elizabeth Robinson 
       & 
              Fernando Pessoa 
 
When asked about her methodology in an exchange of emails, she explains the 
possibilities of lateral movement and lyrically non-normative engagements with 
narrative: 
   As for Also Known As, I really didn't have a methodology.  I would say that 
  I muddled my way through a series of permissions.  Definitely Spicer's  
  willingness in After Lorca to mistranslate, translate posthumously   
  written poems, affix half a translation to half of a Spicer poem influenced  
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  me.  I guess I think of the conventional take on the persona poem to be  
  narratively linked: here is the story of an individual and now I will inhabit  
  it.  Spicer and Pessoa suggest movements that are much more lateral: the  
  linearity of narrative is nicely disrupted if you can shift among multiple 
  personae or layer personae on personae so that the very idea of a speaker  
  is muddied.  In my mystical way, I am always interested in "presence" and  
  the ways that can blur into and out of persona.  I guess I just think that in  
  any given poem there are always multiple voices at play.  
 Robinson performs a fracturing of the I that speaks not only to the generative 
potentiality of a disrupted subject, but to the impossibility of the full self, an 
impossibility that informs Spicer’s and Hawkey’s inhabitations of poetic corpses. 
These inhabitations echo Ann Lauterbach’s idea of the complete fragment. Lauterbach, 
in The Night Sky (a collection of essays and talks given over two decades), returns again 
and again to ideas of fragmentation and peripheral perspective as liberating 
incompletions. “Poetry protects language from serving any master,” she argues. “One 
can see better from the periphery than from the center” (3). Lauterbach explicitly pits 
her sense of fragmentation against the fragmentation of Stein, Eliot, and Pound—a 
group-able set, she argues, with a common sense of fragmentation which “laments a lost 
whole” (42). While Ashbery’s poetics influenced her own, I argue that Lauterbach is 
actually arguing for more of a remove from the Romantic notion of self than Ashbery (at 
least in his work from the 70s) allows himself. Ashbery’s fragments speak to each other, 
but often in the ghost shadow of the absent whole. In her retrieval of the (Post)Modern 
self’s fragmented composite, Lauterbach argues that fragments should be considered in 
relation to other fragments; not in relation to some lost whole. Part of why we can never 
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be whole rests in our conflation of truth/knowledge/experience and being/presence. If 
we can’t be everywhere, we can’t know everything, we can’t be complete. Our 
subjectivity is, in many ways, synonymous with our situatedness. Lauterbach suggests 
that “thoughts take on different meanings depending on where they are situated 
(otherwise, we would cease to read and write) just as we take on different aspects 
depending on with whom we are conversing” (4). This broad argument about knowledge 
and experience—an ontological and existential juggernaut of a framing—homes in on 
the subjectivity I’ve been poking here. According to Lauterbach: 
 The crucial job of artists is to find a way to release materials into the animated 
 middle ground between subjects, and so to initiate the difficult but joyful process 
 of human connection. This is not only the relation of a given self to a given other, 
 but to show how that relation might move further to a consciousness of persons 
 and publics beyond our familiar horizons (6-7). 
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Conclusion 
 
 So what?  
 Challenges to the authority of a contained, speaking I have probably been around 
since at least the stories told in pre-history, certainly in the teachings of classical Greek 
thought, and have persisted since. Fineman argues that a new subjectivity was 
introduced in Shakespeare’s sonnets, and this subjectivity developed its thorny, varied 
characteristics over the following centuries. In the early nineteenth century, Shelley 
insists, “Each is at once the centre and the circumference; the point to which all things 
are referred, and the line in which all things are contained.” A century later, Pound 
famously claimed that “points define a periphery,” directing the attention a little from 
the center-self to the outlying limits that define the center (the still point of the turning 
world?), but still maintaining a centered self around which all understanding orbits, 
even if that central I begins to fracture and wander. Ashbery begins to inhabit the 
periphery of the wandering I, dreaming of a center while becoming increasingly 
skeptical of its likelihood. A generation later, Hawkey and Robinson are actively 
attempting to Other the self further, to merge I’s with dead centers, to redefine the 
entire schematic again. 
 So what? 
 Language Poetry took the desubjectification implicit in the postmodern avant-
garde and ran it to its logical extremes, de-authoring poetry via methodologies of 
mathematical rigidness and chance operations, among others. Today, writers like 
Hawkey andRobinson are reintroducing a subjectivity mediated through “collaboration” 
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and intentional subverting of a 1:1 exchange across selves, cultures, and ideas. Divesting 
themselves of monovocal agency, they are nevertheless retrieving some of the human 
error (aesthetic ordering, revision, intuition) eschewed by the extremes of Language 
Poetics. They are reclaiming humanity! 
 So what? 
 So, of course, any investigation into the constraining aperture of the constructed 
self is more than a question of poetic style or general aesthetics. Such rigorous cultural 
students as Judith Butler and Arjun Appadurai make compelling arguments that our 
ability to step outside of our easiest viewpoints is integral to transcending the same 
weary binaries perpetuated by politically charged histories between a) those in positions 
of power over our wider narratives and b) those subjected to the limited agency of the 
myopic “I.”  
 In discussing globalization and global inter-dependency, Arjun Appadurai urges 
using “perspectival constraints” to honor the subjectivity of all imposed orders. In 
poetry, what is a perspectival constraint if not the pronoun, the author’s chosen seat? 
Appadurai views scapes the same way that Michel de Certeau approaches cities-as-
sentences: using scale, mutability, fluidity to flesh out the dimensions of our 
environments—not in the pursuit of a comprehensive “mastery” of our surrounds, but 
rather to more fully debunk the wish for objective control latent (and, in fact, 
encouraged) within fixed perspectives.  
 Judith Butler argues that the dynamics of the apostrophe are more than mere 
semantic play; more, in fact, than responsible world citizenship—they are a matter of 
existential crisis: “If the Other is obliterated, so too is language, since language cannot 
survive outside of the conditions of address” (Precarious Life, 139). Butler’s Precarious 
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Life wonderfully investigates the inherent powers of apostrophic dynamics, particularly 
focusing on the role of a “we” in times of grief and the dangerous power of using the 
I/You split to enable an Othering of the You that preemptively strikes against the 
collective experience of empathetic mourning and shared identification. To be sure, 
there is an entrenched political component within the IYou negotiation. As Butler 
argues, “Dissent is quelled, in part, through threatening the speaking subject with an 
uninhabitable identification” (xix). We are all, always, performing and enduring identity 
construction. This construction of an I is inextricable from the influence of the many 
“You”s it encounters, be they other people, social structures, or alternate versions of the 
self. To simply accept the identity we are handed (“American,” “male,” “capitalist,” 
“liberal,” “essay-writing über-nerd,” “self-deprecatingly self-referential sycophant,” 
“postmodern poet,” etc.) without inspection is dangerous indeed.  
 Lauterbach tells us that instability and incompletion are immanent in our 
constructed identities, and that these identities are necessarily fragmented and 
responsive to situation. The reverse is true also: by creating new selves, we create new 
situations. Butler adds that there are norms of recognition inscribed in the role of 
“subject.” So, when Eliot stages a mono-harmony of doubled selves, Stein practices her 
ventriloquism, Spicer is possessed by the signal, or Ashbery deputizes his army of 
mimetic fragments, the norms and capabilities of speech and recognition are slowly 
altered. When a generation or three later, Hawkey’s soaked, buckshot pages, his assured 
dismantling of his own mouth, and Robinson’s hyper-literate costume party continue to 
blur the sense of exterior and interior, their work is truly modeling new ways of 
considering the world, the Other, the You. 
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 Martin Buber, in his well-known mystical treatise, I and Thou, describes, among 
many other things, a co-dependency inherent in apostrophe: “When one says You, the I 
of the word pair I-You is said, too” (54). Reciprocity is essential to the survival of both 
poles of the address. “I require a You to become; becoming I, I say You” (62).  
 This reciprocity becomes more suggestive when we realize that apostrophic 
identities are fluid, and that the fluidity is not just between the I and the You. It is 
inevitable, in Buber’s apostrophic schematic, that a “You” regularly becomes an “it.” 
“The sublime melancholy of our lot,” he calls it (68). I argue that an I also becomes an 
“it,” especially when the role of the speaking, poetic I is performed so complacently that 
its reflexive performer forgets that she or he is performing. This forgetfulness—this 
absent, de rigueur recital—arrests the dynamic potential of poetic voice and, therefore, 
the possibilities of social and cultural engagement and agency. It is in this 
defamiliarizing of the contained, speaking self that Postmodern (and later) poetry has 
found increasing guidance.  
 By exercising the ability to inhabit new subjectivities, these poets are showing us 
how to build new muscles for the exhaustive quotidian practice of contemporary identity 
construction. While we may have more opportunity in the digital age to reinvent 
ourselves nightly, the profound effects of broader cultural systems on our identities are 
incalculable. Hopefully skeptical of the manipulative potential of imposed and reductive 
binaries, we may realize that we are neither fully at the mercy of outside pressures nor 
possessing full self-determination and agency of identity. Butler argues, “When we are 
speaking about the ‘subject’ we are not always speaking about an individual: we are 
speaking about a model for agency and intelligibility, one that is very often based on 
notions of sovereign power.” She continues, “The ‘I’ who cannot come into being without 
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a ‘you’ is also fundamentally dependent on a set of norms of recognition that originated 
neither with the ‘I’ nor with the ‘you’” (45).   
 To defamiliarize the I, the Contemporary Postmodern poet continues to explode 
the nostalgic dream of the contained self before picking up the fragments, dusting them 
off, and seeing what they have to say for themselves. By embracing this plurality of 
open, responsive selves, we are effectively burying the mythological fullness of subject 
and object. It’s a necessary internment. Get out your casserole dishes, get ice for the 
whiskey. Once buried, even memorialized in pageantry and song, we can start banging 
our new martial heartbeat into the “resonant hollowness of a fractured, verbal self.” It’s 
a hard dream to give up on, but saving its seat at the table isn’t going to feed anyone. It’s 
like burying a dead pet: order a discount taxidermy kit online and preserve it in any pose 
you most fondly remember, but it’s not going to play catch any longer. Time to go to the 
pound and pick a whole new litter of mutts to start ranging and marking the shifting 
streets of Contemporary Postmodernism. The full self is dead. Long live the full self. 
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